Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen, Mette Gørtz, John Kennes, Elena Mattana, Christopher A. Neilson, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, "Queuing for Segregation: Evidence from Access to Childcare in Copenhagen", , 2025.

@article{ queing-segregation-childcare-copenhagen_2025,
  title = "Queuing for Segregation: Evidence from Access to Childcare in Copenhagen",
  author = "Bjerre-Nielsen, Andreas and Gørtz, Mette and Kennes, John and Mattana, Elena and Neilson, Christopher A. and Pakzad-Hurson, Bobak",
  journal = "",
  year = "2025",
  note = "wip"
,
  abstract = "Childcare access in Copenhagen is governed by a centralized queue-based allocation system that requires families to pre-select up to two daycare centers well in advance. While intended to promote fairness and efficiency, this institutional design embeds a strategic component that systematically advantages higher socioeconomic status (SES) families.We show that the process of queue selection is a form of strategic shortlisting, closely related to mechanism design problems where agents face constraints on how many options they can express. Families must anticipate future availability and the behavior of others, under uncertainty, when choosing which queues to join. Importantly, these decisions are made while facing unequal outside options—such as access to informal care or job flexibility—which vary systematically with SES.Our empirical analysis combines administrative data with new survey evidence. We find that high-SES families are more likely to apply strategically: they choose riskier or more desirable queues and make aggressive choices such as requesting earlier start dates than they actually need, to gain queue priority. Survey responses confirm that many parents would prefer to start later but request earlier access to improve their chances—highlighting a strategic manipulation of start timing.Further, we document that preferences over timing are tied to labor market considerations. For many parents, particularly those with fewer resources, delays in access create tangible economic costs—such as postponed return to work. These heterogeneous time preferences, coupled with structural constraints in the application process, generate unequal access outcomes and reinforce existing socioeconomic divides.We develop a theoretical framework capturing strategic queue choice under constraints, incorporating uncertainty, outside options, and requeuing frictions. Through simulations, we evaluate alternative designs, showing how modest changes—such as increasing the number of choices or reducing penalties for declining offers—could reduce inequities without sacrificing efficiency.Our findings demonstrate that allocation mechanisms, even when formally neutral, can produce unequal outcomes due to the strategic behavior they incentivize. In doing so, the paper contributes to understanding how public service design can unintentionally deepen segregation and socioeconomic inequality."
,
  url_article = ""
}