Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms

Abstract

We study the welfare and human capital impacts of colleges' (non)participation in Chile's centralized higher-education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: the introduction of a large scholarship program and the inclusion of additional institutions, which raised the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40%. We first show that the expansion of the platform raised on-time graduation rates. We then develop and estimate a model of college applications, offers, wait lists, matriculation, and graduation. When the platform expands, welfare increases, and welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates are less sensitive to off-platform frictions. Gains are larger for students from lower-socioeconomic-status backgrounds.

Citation & BibTeX

Adam Kapor, Mohit Karnani, Christopher A. Neilson, "Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms", Journal of Political Economy (July 2024), 2024, doi: 10.1086/730207.

Figures From the Paper

  • Coauthors: Adam Kapor, Mohit Karnani
  • Published: Journal of Political Economy (July 2024)
  • Date: 2024-07-01
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